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RECENT LEGISLATION
Discriminatory Employment Practices-Philadelphia Ordinance
Prohibits Discrimination Because of Race, Creed, Color, National
Origin, or Ancestry-After stating that discrimination because of
race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry adversely affects the health
and safety as well as the gainful employment of large segments of the
city's population, The Philadelphia Fair Employment Practices Ordi-
nance ' prohibits certain defined unfair practices 2 on the part of any em-
ployer, employment agency, or labor organization not specifically exempted
by the provisions of the act.3 The ordinance creates a five man commis-
sion with power not only to investigate all complaints of unfair employ-
ment practices duly brought by an aggrieved individual 4 but also, after
notice and hearing, to enter such order "as the facts warrant." If any re-
spondent fails to comply with such order the commission is directed to cer-
tify the record and its findings to the City Solicitor who is authorized to
invoke the aid of a court of appropriate jurisdiction to impose the pre-
scribed penalties.5 The commission is also directed to carry out an edu-
cational program designed to eliminate prejudice and discrimination.
Empirical data obtained from war-time operations of the temporary
national Committee on Fair Employment Practice 6 were utilized by both
the framers of the pioneer New York statute 7 and the unsuccessful spon-
sors of Federal anti-discrimination laws; 8 the legislation they produced has
served as a model for a majority of the subsequent state 9 and local en-
1. JOURNAL OF THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, app. 111, pp. 179-185 (March 11,
1948). For a general discussion of the field see Elson and Schanfield, Local Regida-
tio of Diescriminatory Employment Practices, 56 YALE L. J. 430 (1947).
2. Sec. 4. The eight subsections enumerate acts which constitute unfair employ-
ment practices on the part of employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations
such as refusing to hire, discriminating in promotion or terms of employment, limiting
employment or membership by means of a quota system, as well as making any inquiry
or circulating any advertisement indicating any discrimination or preference because
of race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry. However, it is specifically pro-
vided in the absence of a violation of the enumerated prohibitions that it shall not be
deemed an unfair employment practice to select any person whose experience, qualifi-
cations, and training best adapt him to further the interest and welfare of his em-
ployer. Also, the Commission is authorized to certify "bona fide occupational qualifi-
cations" which apparently gives it authority to make a declaratory order when so
requested by an employer.
3. Sec. 3 exempts fraternal, sectarian, charitable, or religious organizations; also
persons employed in domestic service or employees who serve in "personal and con-
fidential positions."
4. Sec. 7(a) resolves a point of controversy in earlier legislation by permitting
"an organization which has as one of its purposes the combatting of discrimination or
of promoting full, free or equal opportunities" to make a charge of an unfair employ-
ment practice.
5. Sec. 8 provides a fine not exceeding One Hundred Dollars for each violation,
or if such fine is not paid within ten days imprisonment not to exceed thirty days.
6. 3 CoDE FED. REGS. Exec. Order No. 8802 (Cum. Supp. 1943) and as enlarged
by 3 CODE FED. REGS. Exec. Order No. 9346 (Cum. Supp. 1943). For a summary of
the activities of the Committee, see NAT. RELATIONS ADVISORY CouxciL, F. E. P. C.
REFERENcE MANUAL 34 (1948).
7. N. Y. EXEc. LAW §§ 125-36 (McKinney, Supp. 1947).
8. Typical bills are: S. 2048, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944); S. 101, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1945) ; S. 984, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
9. 18 N. J. STAT. ANN., c. 25-1 (West, Supp. 1946); 4 MASS. LAWS ANN., c.
151B (Michie, Supp. 1947) ; CoNN. GEN. STAT., c. 279, § 1360i (Supp. 1947). Stat-
utes in other states are little more than declarations of public policy: IND. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-2301 (Burns, Supp. 1947) ; WIs. LAWS 1945, c. 490; OREGON LAWS 1947, c. 508.
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actments 10 including the instant ordinance. However, there are certain
provisions of the Philadelphia act which differ somewhat from those of
earlier laws. Thus, avoiding arbitrary classifications" apparently thought
to be justified on administrative grounds, the draftsmen have wisely sub-
jected to its processes all those who employ "one or more persons." 2
They also saw fit to exempt employees who stand in a "personal and
confidential" relationship 's to their employers; it will call for enlightened
interpretation on the part of both commission and courts to prevent this
provision from becoming a serious threat to effective operation of the act.
Another striking difference arises out of the absence of direction to the
commission or its staff to observe secrecy during the initial persuasive
proceedings.'" In fact, after investigating and seeking to adjust any com-
plaint of an unfair employment practice, the commission is specifically di-
rected to "make and publish appropriate findings as a result of its investi-
gations." ' 5 Judicious use of its rule making power 18 should enable the
commission not only to adopt confidential procedures which have been
highly successful in other jurisdictions 17 but also to utilize to the fullest
possible extent the inherent flexibility of the administrative process.
Although no court of last resort has ruled on the constitutionality of
anti-discrimination laws as applicable to the private employer, the unani-
mous decision of the United States Supreme Court in upholding the
validity of a statute forbidding discrimination in a labor union ' 8 should
leave little doubt that such regulations are a valid exercise of the police
power.' 9 The authority of local governments to enact such prohibitory
10. Minneapolis has already passed an ordinance which is a counterpart of the
New York law while similar ordinances have been proposed in Cleveland, Detroit, and
many other cities. Chicago and Milwaukee acts leave enforcement up to the indi-
vidual.
11. Typical is the New York law, supra note 8, which exempts any employer who
employs less than six persons. Such classification might prove troublesome in the equal
protection test of constitutionality.
12. See. 3.
13. Sec. 3. Proponents of the ordinance made vigorous attempts to procure the
deletion of this clause, but they had to content themselves with the substitution of the
present wording in lieu of "personal or confidential."
14. Under the language of section 6(a) it is clear that the commission must seek
to adjust by conciliation and mediation all complaints of unfair employment practices.
Experience has shown that informal preliminary conferences which are confidential
create an atmosphere favorable to amicable and satisfactory settlement of differences.
The necessity of retreat from a publicly-expressed position, which has stalemated
many attempts to settle disputes by persuasive methods, is obviated. The realization
on the part of both sides that the discussions are "off the record" leads to a candid
and searching exploration of the controversy with a consequent greater appreciation
of the problems confronting the opposite party.
15. Sec. 6(b).
16. Sec. 6(e). In this regard a satisfactory result might be obtained either by
proper control of the time of release of such information or by limiting the scope of
the phrase "appropriate findings" embodied in § 6(b).
17. Notably New York and New Jersey. Following the mandates of their stat-
utes, these two states have maintained the strictest confidence during all phases of the
investigative and persuasive processes, and according to their current reports have
handled no fewer than 1603 complaints without resorting in a single instance to a pub-
lic hearing. But for a criticism of this policy when it is carried too far, see Note, 56
YAL L. J. 837, 857 (1947).
18. Railway Mail Ass'n. v. Corsi, 326 U. S. 88 (1945). Note especially the strong
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter.
19. See Waite, Constitutionality of the Proposed Minnesota Fair Enployment
Practices Act, 32 MrhN. L. REv. 349 (1948). Analogies based upon cases sustaining
the constitutionality of the Wagner Act's prohibitions against discrimination because
of union activity should be very helpful in this regard. N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laugh-
lin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937) ; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N. L. L B., 313 U. S. 177
(1941).
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measures, however, depends upon the extent of the power delegated to
them by the state legislature.20 While comprehensive Federal legislation
aimed at unfair employment practices would be highly desirable, it seem
extremely unlikely that such treatment will be achieved on the national
level within the foreseeable future. Despite these uncertainties, widespread
activity on the part of groups interested in broadening the area of cover-
age 21 and the gratifying results already obtained in pioneer jurisdictions 2
2
presage favorable action by an increasing number of state and local govern-
ments.
20. In Pennsylvania the state legislature has delegated broad powers to the local
governments. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 53, § 6364 (Purdon, 1931). This difficulty may
be obviated in some states by means of enabling acts which will make adoption of un-
fair practices laws discretionary with local governments.
21. This is demonstrated by the large number of states, including Pennsylvania,
which will be called upon to consider such bills at their next legislative sessions.
22. See N. Y. STATE Comm'N AGAINST DIsCRIINATioN ANN. REP. (1947) and
NAT. RZELATIONS ADVISORY COUNCIL, F. E. P. C. REFERENCE MANUAL 43 (1948).
